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Fine-tuning of health insurance regulation - unhealthy
consequences for an individual insurer
Abstract
This paper sheds light on some unexpected consequences of health insurance regulation that may pose a
big challenge to insurers' risk management. Because mandated uniform contributions to health insurance
trigger risk-selection efforts, risk adjustment (RA) schemes become necessary. A good deal of research
into the optimal RA formula has been performed. A recent proposal in Switzerland has been to add
'Hospitalization exceeding three days during the previous year' as an indicator of high risk. Applying the
new formula to an individual Swiss health insurer, its payments into the RA scheme are predicted to
increase substantially, reaching up to 13% of premium income. Its mistake had been to implement
Managed Care successfully, resulting in low rates of hospitalization. The expected risk management
response is to extend hospital stays beyond three days, contrary to stated policy objectives. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation
When premiums are mandated to be independent of risk, competitive health insurers
have an incentive to select clients whose future expected health care expenditure does
not exceed their contribution. This consideration has induced secondary regulation
in the guise of risk adjustment (RA) schemes. Basically, RA makes insurers with an
above-average share of favorable risks pay into a fund, whose proceeds are used to
cross-subsidize those insurers with many unfavorable risks. The design of an opti-
mal RA formula is a widely discussed topic (see for example Lamers, 1999, Ellis and
Van de Ven, 2000, Glazer and McGuire, 2002, Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003a, Lamers
and Van Vliet, 2003b, Van de Ven et al., 2004, Jack, 2006, Beck et al., 2006, Zweifel and
Breuer, 2006, and Van de Ven and Schut, 2007). The RA formulas for Medicare in the
United States and the Netherlands are being refined continuously (see e.g Calfo, 2009
and Douven, 2007). However, so far the consequences of this fine tuning of regulation
for the risk management of insurers seem to have been neglected.
This contribution contains a case study from Switzerland, a country that relies on
competitive health insurance in a way similar to the US and the Netherlands. A RA
scheme was introduced in 1996, using the two criteria age and gender only. Effective
2012, the RA formula will include a third indicator of high risk, viz. ”Hospitalization of
more than three days or living in a nursing home during the previous year” (see Spycher,
2000). While this choice is largely dictated by service providers’ refusal to pass on
diagnostic information to health insurers, it does have several recommendable features
in that it (1) has significant predictive power (see Beck, 2004 and Holly et al., 2003),
(2) relates to a previous period so does not undermine insurers’ effort at controlling
health care cost, (3) avoids gaming by excluding elective short-term stays, and (4) can
be measured at little administrative expense.
Refinement of the RA formula has gone much farther in other countries. In the United
States, the CMS hierarchical condition categories model (CMS-HCC) has been in use
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with Medicare since 2004. It comprises all encounters, regardless of whether they are
inpatient or outpatient (see Pope et al., 2004). In the Netherlands diagnostic-cost
groups (DCGs) and pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs) are used as high-risk indica-
tors.1 Both refinements consider the severity of an inpatient case2. These reforms have
their costs and benefits. On the benefit side, risk-selection efforts by health insurers
are reduced if the net cost of medical care falling on them is increasingly equalized
across risk types. Moreover, this net cost does not depend anymore on whether the
insured was hospitalized or not. On the cost side, these refinements of RA not only
require more accounting effort on the part of both insurers and providers but also in-
crease proneness to error3. Moreover, they create incentives for up-coding diagnoses
(for an explicit analysis of advantages and disadvantages in the case of U.S. Medicare,
see Kominski, 2007 and Pope et al., 2000).
The purpose of this paper is to point out another cost of RA refinement. Indeed, it
may boost payments into the RA scheme to an extent as to jeopardize the economic
survival of an otherwise viable health insurer, posing a great challenge to its risk man-
agement (RM). Now insolvency and hence market exit of an insurer who only survived
thanks to cream skimming may be considered to be efficiency enhancing. However, this
case study deals with an innovative health insurer, who had successfully implemented
Managed Care to lower rates of hospitalization. Bankruptcy of such an insurer would
have to be considered inefficient.
The evidence comes from simulating payments for a particular health insurer A into
the RA scheme applying the old and the new formula. These simulations predict that
A’s payments would have increased significantly, attaining between 9 and 13 percent
of premium income. Extra payments of these magnitudes would have seriously endan-
1 They are derived from the diagnoses related to prior hospitalization and prior use of prescription
drugs, see e.g. Van de Ven and Schut, 2008.
2 The CMS-HCC also accounts for the severity of an outpatient case.
3 In the Netherlands, the complexity of processing the data and money flows led to errors in the
calculation of the ex-ante risk-adjusted capitation payments, resulting in a loss of Euro 247mn.,
falling on taxpayers (see Douven, 2007).
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gered insurer A’s economic survival, leading to a cumulative loss in excess of CHF 250
mn. (1 CHF = 0.83 US$ at 2010 exchange rates) over three years.
While A’s risk management response cannot be predicted, there are two main alter-
natives. One is to enlist unfavorable risks, as intended by the regulator. The other is
to extend hospital stays from three to four days. This strategy would have decreased
this insurer’s RA payments by an estimated 11 percent in 2007. The consequences
would be unhealthy for taxpayers (who subsidize hospital cost), employers (who lose
workdays), and patients (who lose quality of life). While not directly transferable to
other countries with competitive health insurance (such as the United States, but also
Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands), the findings of this contribution convey a clear
message. Seemingly minor fine tuning of health insurance regulation has the potential
of challenging an insurer’s risk management, with undesirable consequences for the
society.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the method
for calculating risk adjustment values in general and the data basis. In the first part
of Section 3, RA values are simulated according to the new formula and applied to
insurer A. The second part of Section 3 analyzes the impact of this regulatory change
on insurer A’s risk management. The paper concludes with lessons learned from this
case study and its implications.
2 Simulation of Risk Adjustment Values and Data
Basis
2.1 Methodology
Traditionally, analysis of risk management focuses on payments between health insur-
ers. However, this neglects the fact that payments into the RA scheme are ultimately
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borne by low-risk consumers while payments from the scheme benefit high-risk con-
sumers. Economic theory has always distinguished between payers and bearers of a
cost or levy, in particular in the context of an indirect tax. To see the analogy, consider
current Swiss RA with two criteria age and gender only. Define P¯ as the community-
rated premium, L¯a,g, as the average HCE in one of the age-gender cells (a, g) of RA
(neglecting administrative expense for simplicity), and RAa,g as the payment to or
from the RA scheme. The premium paid by a specific individual i who is a low risk
compared to the cohort in the age-gender cell (a, g), and whose expected cost E(Li) is
thus below average for the specific cell can then be expressed as
P¯ = L¯a,g +RAa,g, with RAa,g > 0 (1)
= E(Li) + (L¯a,g − E(Li)) + (P¯ − L¯a,g). (2)
This particular low risk bears, on top of his or her actuarially fair premium E(Li), a
cross-subsidy in favor of high risks consisting of two components. The first component
is the difference between average HCE of group (a, g) and the individual’s expected
HCE denoted by E(Li); the second, the contribution to the RA scheme (P¯ − L¯a,g), to
be paid by the insurer. The sum of the two will be referred to as cross-subsidization
values. As to the second component, the current Swiss RA formula comprises 15 age
classes, starting from age 19 to 25 and continuing in 5-year steps. Thus, there are
overall 30 RA categories. Since by law risk adjustment must not lead to a cross-
subsidization between the 26 cantons (i.e. member states of Switzerland), the RA
values are calculated yearly for each canton by the Joint Organization KVG based on
data of all Swiss health insurers (see Joint Organization KVG, 2008). Adopting the
insurer’s point of view rather than the consumer’s now, the RA values are equal to
RAa,g = L¯a,g − L¯ (3)
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with L¯ (= P¯ in eq.(1) since administrative expense is neglected) denoting average HCE
in the canton’s population as a whole (see Beck et al. [2006], ch. 4). Including the
criterion ”hospitalization”4 changes eq.(3) to
RAa,g,h = L¯a,g,h − L¯. (4)
The subscript h is equal to 1 if a hospital stay in the previous year exceeds three days
and 0 otherwise. Average HCE of the respective RA cell, L¯a,g,h, now has to be calcu-
lated for 60 instead of 30 groups, while L¯ remains the same.
The insurer has to contribute to the RA fund for favorable risks (L¯a,g,h<L¯). The RA
fund uses the proceeds to cover the deficits generated by unfavorable risks (L¯a,g,h>L¯).
An insurer’s total payment (V ) into/from the RA fund depends on the composition of
its insured over all 26 cantons (c),
V =
26∑
c=1
1∑
h=0
1∑
g=0
15∑
a=1
RAa,g,h,c · na,g,h,c. (5)
An insurer receives payments if V >0 and contributes to risk adjustment if V <0.
2.2 Data
For calculating the RAa,g,h,c values in eq.(5) for a given health insurer, the cell-specific
averages L¯a,g,h,c must be known. Since RAa,g,h,c is not published by the Joint Or-
ganization KVG, two different sources are used to analyze the impact of the new RA
formula on an individual health insurer. The first is constructed by merging individual
HCE data provided by three large health insurers in order to calculate the average
RAa,g,h,c. Ideally it should be representative of all Swiss health insurers. The second
data base comes from the one individual Swiss health insurer ”A”. Both are limited
4 This is shorthand for ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous year of
four days and more”.
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to individuals having mandatory health insurance.
Descriptive Statistics
Data of the three large Swiss health insurers (out of a total of 70 serving a population
of 7.5 mn.) is available for the period 2001 to 2005. The sample is well balanced with
respect to gender (49.5 percent of women), and average age of adult enrollees (47.4
years in 2005, compared to 47.8 years of the adult population). The market share
covered is stable across age classes, amounting to 25 percent on average. With regard
to choice of contract, there is a clear trend towards higher deductibles. The three
highest deductibles (CHF 1,500, 2,000 and 2,500; 1 CHF=0.83 US$ at 2010 exchange
rates) increased in importance from 12 to over 22 percent from 2001 to 2005, which is
compared to the official figures of 13 and 23 percent very representative (Sante´suisse,
2010a). There is a similar trend in favor of Managed Care contracts, reaching a share
of 11 percent in 2005 (compared to the Swiss average of less than 10 percent in 2005,
see Eugster et al.).
The second data source, obtained from A, covers the period 2001 to 2007. With 51.3
percent of women, the sample is almost balanced. A is one of the medium-sized health
insurers in Switzerland with a market share of almost 5 percent in 2005. With 47.7
years, average age of A’s adult enrollees is slightly higher than the 47.4 years of the
three insurers. The clientele of A also tends towards higher deductibles. The share
of the three highest deductibles (they are CHF 1,000, CHF 1,500, and CHF 2,500)
exceeds the nation-wide average of 22 percent in 2005. Managed Care (MC) contracts
account for almost 35 percent (2007), double the nationwide average of 16.9 percent
(Sante´suisse, 2010b). This most likely explains A’s comparatively low rate of hospi-
talization (see Figure 3 below).5 On the whole A looks like an innovative insurer that
encourages MC options, in conformity with stated objectives of Swiss policy makers.
5 In the US MC plans have achieved most of their cost savings by reducing inpatient hospital use
(see Miller and Luft, 1997 and Bindman et al., 2005. See Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004 for MC
cost savings in Switzerland).
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Checking Simulated RA Payments
First, the data provided by the three large health insurers had to be checked for repre-
sentativeness using the current RA formula. The values for RAa,g were calculated for
all 30 cells along with their standard errors according to the methodology described in
Section 2.1 and compared with the official nationwide values. The insurers on average
pay for women aged 19 to 25 more than CHF 1,700 per year (see Figure 1 for the canton
of Zurich, the leading canton of Switzerland both in terms of GDP and population, and
Table 1 in the Appendix for all cantons). Conversely, they receive payment for over
90 year old women to the tune of some CHF 8,600. While the fit is good in general,
RA contributions by the three insurers are lower than the official figures from age 61 on.
Based on the evidence, one can conclude that the three major health insurers sampled
are sufficiently representative of the Swiss population to enable a simulation of the new
RA formula based on their data. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that
one of the three is a net recipient of payments from the RA scheme, one breaks even,
and one is a net contributor to the scheme. Also note that according to Table 1 of
the Appendix, the standard error and hence variance of RA payments increases with
age, reflecting the fact that variance of HCE increases as well. This means that for
a risk-averse health insurer, risk-selection effort has a high payoff if focused on older
clients. By the same token, however, an insurer like A who counts on having to pay into
the RA scheme permanently faces a liability characterized by great risk as its insured
population ages.
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Figure 1: Official RA values according to age and gender (canton of Zurich, 2005)
Note: 1 CHF = 0.83 US$ at 2010 exchange rates.
Figure 2: Estimated RA values with and without hospitalization across age groups
(canton of Zurich, 2005)
Note: 1 CHF = 0.83 US$ at 2010 exchange rates.
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3 Simulating the Impacts of the New RA Formula
In this section, estimated RA values with the new RA formula including hospitalization
during the previous year are presented first. Then, the impacts of the regulatory fine-
tuning on health insurer A in terms of financial burden and choice of strategy are
shown.
3.1 Risk Adjustment with the New Criterion
Official RA values grouped according to the additional criterion, ”Hospitalization dur-
ing the previous year” are not available.6 They have been simulated using the individ-
ual HCE data provided by the three major health insurers (see Section 2.1). Figure 2
illustrates estimated RAa,g,h,c values for the canton of Zurich.
Comparing Figures 1 and 2 the new formula is seen to induce radical changes. First of
all, it causes the amount of cross-subsidization between those without a hospital stay in
the previous year to shrink considerably beyond age 70. Conversely, it causes persons
with a hospital stay to be cross-subsidized regardless of age or gender. Second, and
related to this, the usual age profile ceases to exist. For instance, hospitalized women
in the 19 to 25 age group benefit more than the three next older groups, and at the
high end, it is the aged 86 to 90 rather than the oldest that benefit most. Among men,
the age profile becomes almost level beyond age 70. Third, the per capita amounts
now are higher, pointing to a substantial increase in the volume of cross-subsidization.
Eugster et al. simulate the effects of introducing the third criterion on the total volume
of cross-subsidization for 2005. They find an increase of 40 percent, from CHF 4.13 bn.
to CHF 5.82 bn., or some 12 percent of Swiss HCE. Whether this is excessive or not is
an issue that cannot be addressed in this paper. However, a change of this magnitude
is likely to present a challenge to the RM of at least some health insurers. Whether
this is the case of insurer A is the topic of the two subsections below.
6 Official statistics do show RA values as ”RA payments between consumers”, but only according
to the current RA formula (see Joint Organization KVG, 2008).
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3.2 Impacts on Risk Adjustment Payments by Health Insurer A
The consequences of adding the new risk adjuster ”hospitalization” for health insurer
A can be simulated as follows. The volume of payments is calculated as the number
of A’s customers in a RA cell7, times the estimated RA value pertaining to that RA
cell, and adding up (see eq.(5), Section 2.1). These calculations are performed using
the old and the new RA formula for the years 2005 to 2007. They allow to ”postdict”
the consequences the new RA formula would have had if already in effect. The results
are striking.
• Total payments of A into the RA scheme increase substantially. Under the old
formula, they amount to CHF 24.2 mn. in 2005, corresponding to 3 percent of
premium income. Had the new RA formula already been in effect, they would
have reached CHF 101.6 mn., amounting to no less than 13 percent of premium
income. Considering that A operated at a loss of CHF 8.2 mn. in 2005, the
new formula would, ceteris paribus, have caused a total loss of CHF 85.6 mn.
(= 8.2 + 101.6− 24.2).
• For the years 2006 and 2007, payments according to the new RA formula are
estimated to be CHF 73.5 and 82.3 mn., respectively, compared to the CHF 2.6
and 2.3 mn. under the current RA formula. In terms of premium income, the
shares would have been 9 and 13 percent, respectively, resulting in losses of CHF
54.8 and 86.2 mn., ceteris paribus.
• Payments of A into the RA scheme increase in all cantons. In some, A even turns
from receiver into payer, such as in the cantons of Vaud (VD) and Geneva (GE).
This precludes a regional restructuring of A’s business as a possible RM response;
for this reason, this alternative will not be discussed in Section 3.3 below.
Arguably, these developments would have jeopardized A’s economic survival. Start-
ing with the underwriting result, the combined ratio (defined as loss payments plus
7 For added precision, calculations are based on months of contract life.
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administrative expense plus RA values relative to premium income) was very close to
100 percent over the time period considered, viz. 102.3 (2005), 99.8 (2006), and 100.3
percent (2007).8 This is not fatal as long as the insurer is making enough profits from
capital investment (see e.g. Zweifel and Eisen [2003], ch. 5), which was indeed the
case in 2007. However, the new RA formula would have caused the combined ratio to
attain 111.9 (2005), 107.5 (2006), and 110.7 percent (2007) respectively, amounts that
could not have easily been compensated by profits from capital investment. Accord-
ing to Browne and Hoyt [1995], who analyze market predictors of insolvencies in US
property-liability insurance between 1970 and 1990, a 5 point increase of the combined
ratio causes the insolvency rate to increase by roughly 22 percent. Even if this result
cannot be directly applied to health insurers operating in a different country, a 10
point hike in the combined ratio must substantially increase the insolvency risk of an
insurer who has limited reserves. The ordnance on health insurance (Federal Council of
Switzerland, 2003) requires insurers to hold reserves as a function of enrollment. With
more than 150,000 insured, A currently must have reserves amounting to 10 percent
of annual premiums (Sante´suisse, 2009). If A would have used its reserves to make up
for the predicted loss of 2005 under the new RA formula, this ratio would have fallen
to around 5 percent. The predicted loss of 2006 and 2007 would have wiped out its
reserves altogether.
The insolvency of an insurer could be the result of lackluster performance and hence
of little importance to the economy as a whole. However, this does not seem to be
true of insurer A. It did incur a loss in 2005 but was able to turn this into a surplus
for the years 2006 and 2007. In addition, its high predicted payments into RA under
the new RA formula are due to its low hospitalization rates (see Figure 3). For men,
they are (gray bars) significantly lower than the Swiss average (black bars) across all
age groups (women similar but not shown). While successful risk selection cannot be
8 The expense ratio was 5.6 (2005), 5.9 (2006) and 5.6 percent (2007), which is average for Swiss
statutory health insurers.
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excluded completely as an explanation, the evidence points in a different direction.
First, as stated in Section 2.2, the younger age classes and men are only slightly over-
represented. A systematic risk selector would have significantly higher market shares
in this age segment. Second, Managed Care contracts (designed to prevent or shorten
hospital stays) attain a share of 35 percent in 2007, way above the Swiss average of 16.9
percent. At the same time, insurer A’s distribution of MC contracts across age classes
does not systematically differ from that of the representative three insurers. Third,
total HCE per enrollee and its age profile are quite similar between insurer A and the
three others, speaking against cross across-the-board risk-selection effort on the part
of the insurer A. By way of contrast, Figure 4 reveals a marked difference with regard
to the cost of inpatient and outpatient care. Starting with the age group 51 to 55 but
especially beyond age 81, insurer A is markedly below the simulated nationwide bench-
mark (panel a). Now this could still be due to risk-selection efforts cleverly targeted
at the healthy elderly. In that case, however, one would also expect insurer A’s cost
for outpatient care to be comparatively low in the higher age groups. Yet panel (b) of
Figure 3: Hospitalization rate, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, men (2005)
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Figure 4: Inpatient and outpatient cost, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values
(2005)
(a) inpatient (b) outpatient
Figure 4 shows that insurer A’s cost of inpatient care per enrollee is higher than that
of the three representative insurers, and particularly so in the high age groups.
These findings lend credibility to insurer A’s claim to have implemented MC in general
and home care instead of hospital care specifically for the elderly. This has positive
effects not only for the individual patient whose quality of life is higher, but also for the
economy as a whole. Indeed, the cost of outpatient care evidenced in Figure 4 is only
one-half of the true value since the cantons finance roughly 50 percent of hospitals’ op-
erating cost. Implementation of MC concepts thus provides relief to taxpayers. Hence,
rather than acting as a ”cherry-picker”, insurer A seems to be among the foremost in
conforming with stated objectives of Swiss health policy, i.e. to achieve savings through
Managed Care. Insolvency of such an insurer caused by a change in the RA formula
can be justifiably qualified as regulatory failure.
3.3 Impact on Risk Management
It is unlikely that an insurer confronted with the changes described in the preceding
sections can continue with its risk management (RM) strategy unchanged. The two
main alternatives revolve around the two principal activities of an insurer, viz. un-
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derwriting and capital investment. Starting with the latter, the insurer could seek
offsetting returns on capital investments. However, in the present state of the economy
this is very difficult. In addition, capital market theory predicts that higher expected
returns can only be achieved in return for more risk once the efficient frontier has
been reached, a consequence that is not easily accepted by a regulator of social health
insurance. The second possibility is to increase margins from underwriting either by
increasing net premiums or reducing claims. Swiss statutory health insurers have to
pay by law for all services included in the official list of benefits, with most prices
regulated. Therefore, it is not possible to decrease insurance claims significantly. Lia-
bilities arising from underwriting can be reduced by purchasing reinsurance; however,
up to present reinsurers have not been providing coverage against RA liabilities. This
leaves an increase of premiums net of RA payments as the likely RM response. Since
premiums are fixed by community rating regulation, lowering payments into the RA
scheme becomes the preferred alternative.
One way to achieve this objective is to enroll more unfavorable risks, in particular
persons who were hospitalized during the previous year. This is the adjustment the
new RA formula was designed to bring about. The challenge to the insurer’s RM now
becomes to achieve more hospitalizations without incurring much additional cost. Re-
call that a hospitalization counts as soon as it exceeds three days. When segmenting
A’s HCE function according to length of stay in the hospital during the previous year,
it turns out that patients with four days do not cost significantly more than those
with three. Therefore, A has to weigh the once-and-for-all extra cost of a hospital
day against the extra contribution from the RA scheme, which may amount to several
thousand CHF (see Table 1 of the Appendix).
The possible reduction of RA payments can be estimated as follows. While it may not
be possible to collude with the public hospitals (who obtain a per diem roughly twice
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the amount paid by the insurer because one-half of their extra operating cost is cov-
ered by the canton) to extend all hospital stays from three to four days, this should be
possible in 50 percent of all cases. The effect of such a RM response can be estimated
with sufficient precision for the three cantons where A has the highest market share
[viz. Zurich (ZH), Berne (BE), and Vaud (VD)]. There, it would have reduced RA
payments by CHF 5 mn. in 2007. Extrapolating to A’s entire book of business, one
obtains CHF 9 mn., or 11.2 percent of the estimated CHF 82.3 mn. Savings of this
magnitude would have been important enough to induce a change in RM.
The cost of this change would fall on taxpayers (who cover one half of the increased
operating costs of public hospital through cantonal subsidies), employers (who bear the
workdays lost), and patients (who presumably enjoy a higher quality of life outside the
hospital). For this reason, reducing the length of hospital stays has been a stated goal
of Swiss health policy, notably justifying the introduction of hospital payment through
Diagnosis Related Groups by 2012 (DRGs, see SwissDRG, 2009). Thus, the fine tuning
of regulation through an improvement of the RA formula risks to burden the economy
with sizable inefficiencies.
4 Conclusion
Regulation may pose unintended challenges to the risk management (RM) of a com-
pany. This contribution analyzes the case of health insurance, where the imposition
of community rating creates an incentive to select favorable risks. Risk adjustment
(RA) schemes have been implemented in several countries such as Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, and the United States to counteract this incentive. They make insurers
with an above-average share of favorable risks (indicated by age, gender, and other ad-
justers) to pay into the scheme, which supports insurers with an above-average share
of unfavorable risks. Since its current RA formula fails to neutralize the incentive for
risk selection, Switzerland will complement it in 2012 with the adjuster, ”Hospitaliza-
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tion of more than three days or living in a nursing home during the previous year”.
This seemingly minor fine tuning of regulation is shown to have a potentially fatal
effect on a particular health insurer A whose payments into the RA scheme would have
increased substantially between 2005 and 2007 if the new RA formula had been in
effect. The reason is a low rate of hospitalization thanks to a commitment to Managed
Care. Therefore, A’s most likely RM response would have been to increase recognized
hospitalizations by increasing length of stay from three to four days, triggering extra
payments from the RA scheme at a limited once-and-for-all cost of an extra hospital
day. The cost of this change of RM strategy would have been borne by taxpayers
(through increased subsidies of hospitals’ operating expense), employers (through lost
workdays), and patients (through lower quality of life).
There are lessons to be learned for other countries who impose community rating on
competitive health insurers. First, it is practically impossible to fully neutralize insur-
ers’ risk selection incentive through an RA scheme,9 and be it only due to their different
rates of discount in estimating the present value of the benefits and costs associated
with risk selection. Second, perfecting the RA formula can have unintended side effects
at the level of an individual insurer that go as far as jeopardizing its economic survival
in spite of innovative effort. In the case studied here, the insurer is even punished for its
innovative commitment to Managed Care. Finally, the threat of survival may well trig-
ger adjustments in RM strategy that cause an efficiency loss to the economy as a whole.
There is an alternative that avoids the regulatory spiral described here. Health insurers
could be simply permitted to charge premiums according to estimated risk. With
sufficient pressure of competition, this would boil down to ”price equal to expected
marginal cost” since expected future health care expenditure importantly reflects the
insurer’s cost of enrolling an additional customer. Wealthy individuals can pay a high
9 There is the perception that for all its refinement, the all-encounter RA CMS-HCC model over-
pays Medicare Advantage Programs (representing MCOs). We owe this interesting point to the
anonymous referee.
17
risk-based premium out of their own means. The same is true of low-income individuals
who are favorable risks. The problematic group are low-income individuals who are
unfavorable risks. They can be entitled to an earmarked subsidy that kicks in as soon
as their premium exceeds a certain percentage of their income (see Zweifel and Breuer
[2006]). In fact, the new law on health insurance of 2004 introduced such a targeted
subsidy in Switzerland - without however lifting the premium regulation introduced in
1911. The consequence is an avoidable fine tuning of health insurance regulation with
its unhealthy impacts not only on an individual insurer but the economy as a whole.
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Appendix
Table 1: Simulated and official RA payments per capita according to age and gender
(CHF, 2005)
Men Average∗ Std. Min Max Official value
19-25 −2, 007 506 −3, 006 −708 −1, 964
26-30 −1, 228 834 −2, 166 2, 287 −1, 890
31-35 −901 679 −1, 733 1, 202 −1, 771
36-40 −979 422 −1, 749 248 −1, 625
41-45 −829 352 −1, 435 −40 −1, 399
46-50 −544 466 −1, 616 349 −1, 092
51-55 −110 379 −978 715 −625
56-60 290 300 −558 816 13
61-65 885 418 229 1, 649 771
66-70 1, 561 599 188 2, 465 1, 638
71-75 2, 535 549 983 3, 436 2, 873
76-80 3, 209 653 1, 885 4, 128 3, 846
81-85 4, 128 1, 362 1, 262 6, 984 4, 986
86-90 5, 287 1, 208 2, 752 7, 946 6, 880
90+ 6, 732 1, 514 2, 945 8, 916 9, 542
Women Average∗ Std. Min Max Official value
19-25 −1, 773 494 −2, 780 −974 −1, 484
26-30 −1, 025 462 −2, 212 −312 −946
31-35 −746 560 −1, 694 −1, 126 −750
36-40 −961 329 −1, 577 −316 −925
41-45 −966 279 −1, 749 −536 −922
46-50 −732 309 −1, 296 −177 −647
51-55 −443 268 −1, 045 107 −236
56-60 −16 321 −512 842 205
61-65 444 247 20 765 737
66-70 982 396 210 1, 604 1, 415
71-75 1, 983 446 758 2, 662 2, 385
76-80 3, 137 656 1, 838 4, 406 3, 672
81-85 4, 641 776 2, 788 6, 111 5, 596
86-90 6, 917 988 5, 115 8, 383 8, 486
90+ 8, 673 1, 770 4, 465 11, 620 12, 457
1 CHF = 0.83 US$ at 2010 exchange rates
∗ Average over all 26 Swiss cantons
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